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Abstract 
Historically, there have been numerous fraud cases in which firms, which were experiencing financial difficulties or 
having problems in the management of their earnings, were caught cheating in the preparation of their financial 
reports. Thus, the motivation of this action must be identified in order to solve this problem. This study adapts the 
theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) to detect the behaviour of earnings management in the financial 
statement. The purpose of this study is to identify the motivation of earnings management in Malaysia. This paper 
used a set of questionnaires that were distributed to the auditors to gather data regarding the motivation of earnings 
management. The results show that the primary motive for auditors to be involved in earnings management is derived 
from the pressure of affiliated parties. The second motive is altruistic and is followed by speculative motivation.   
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of JIBES University, 
Jakarta   
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1. Introduction  
Managers are always under pressure to improve the profit in financial reporting. A good example in 
Malaysia is the Sime Darby Berhad case. When such a giant corporation suffered huge losses, the top 
management was accused of having masked the truth. This case was brought to the court and further 
action was taken. Another notable case involved the Transmile Group Berhad, in which its officers and 
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directors were charged in the court for publishing a misleading statement in its quarterly report with the 
intention, as reported by Bernama, to induce investors to purchase the Transmile shares. The above two 
cases are an indication of actions by some firms that attempt to hide their actual financial situation in 
order to achieve their desired targets or goals. They are a reflection of the practices of earnings 
management in Malaysia. The Transmile Group Berhad was also involved in an accounting scandal in 
which the revenue and profit were falsified through creative accounting. From this situation, it can be 
depicted that there have been failures in regulatory oversight and full disclosure of the Malaysian capital 
market, unreliability of financial statements and poor corporate governance in Malaysia (The Star, 2007). 
This scandal can be equated to the case of the Enron and WorldCom financial accounting scandals in the 
US many years ago. Therefore, the next section will discuss the motivation to practice earnings 
management followed by a discussion concerning the method that will be used in this study.  
2. Literature review  
2.1 Earnings management  
Although there is a thin line between earnings management and fraud, the difference between them 
must be clearly identified. Brown (1999) and Erickson, Hanlon & Maydew (2006) state that earnings 
management is normally within the scope of GAAP but fraud is outside the GAAP boundaries. However, 
this two matters share the same objective. He also stated that in the US situation, management teams will 
avoid any discussion about this matter and even try to keep away from linking these two concepts. Even 
though earnings management and fraud have a difference in terms of the action, these two matters have 
the same effect on the financial report. According to Perols and Lounge (2011), firms will commit fraud 
because of earnings management constraints. They found that firms that have managed their earnings 
before are more likely to perform fraud. The accuracy of the financial reporting is dependent on the 
existence of these behaviours. A survey conducted by the KPMG Malaysia Fraud Survey 2009 shows that 
66% of the survey respondents believed that fraud is the major problem for business in Malaysia.  
A number of studies interpreted the meaning of earnings management differently. Schipper (1989) 
depicted earnings management as an action when managers manipulate financial reports in order to gain 
extra profit. Healy and Wahlen (1999) defined earnings management as an action in which management 
apply their self-assessment in communicating their financial information and in dealing with transactions 
to modify the financial report for the purposes of: 1) giving a wrong impression to stakeholders about the 
financial information; or 2) influencing any contractual business that relies on the financial reporting. 
In Malaysia, research related to earnings management is not pervasive. Although there has been a lot 
of research in the earnings management area, there are minimal studies that focused on the motivation. 
Earnings management plays an important role in determining the financial information. The absence of 
earnings management in financial reporting can attract investors to invest in a country as it creates a 
positive image in terms of the integrity and reliability of financial reporting, which, ultimately leads to a 
more prosperous and robust economy. Integrity brings about trust, which is an important feature of an 
investment destination. The study is valuable in the sense that it advocates prudence among users of 
financial reporting to check for earnings management before making their decisions based on figures in 
financial reports.   
2.2 Motivation of earnings management  
It is important to know the motive behind this action because in order to prevent such behaviour, the 
causes that lead to the action must first be known. With knowledge of the causes, it can enhance the 
disclosure and transparency of information in financial reporting. Prior studies have suggested that all 
practices of earnings management have motives leading to their actions. According to Chen and Tsai 
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(2010), the three broad categories of motivation that most frequently lead to earnings management are 
altruistic motivation, speculative motivation and pressure from affiliated parties.   
2.2.1 Altruistic motivation   
This motive concerns the interest of other parties. It happens when a manager wants to engage in 
earnings management activities for the good of the company. As stated by Aljifri (2007), the motivations 
to manipulate information on earnings arise most probably driven by the intention to enhance the 
confidence of stakeholders, to alter income taxation and to avoid breaching the covenant in the debt 
contract. Debt covenants are used to avoid managers from undertaking investment and financing 
decisions, which can diminish the value of debt holder claims. A recent study by Latridis and Kadorinis 
(2009) found that firms that have almost acted in ways that violate the debt covenants violation manage 
earnings to avoid financial suffering and disappointing lenders. Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) found that 
managers are expected to use accounting methods that amplify the figures for income in the financial 
reports in the year of violation.  
However, a study by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994) found that the accounting choices 
made by managers of 76 troubled firms on the New York Securities Exchange primarily reflect 
recognition of their firms financial difficulties, rather than being systematic attempts to inflate earnings 
to avoid debt covenant violations or to otherwise portray the firm as less troubled. This means that these 
troubled firms do not apply earnings management in order to hide their situation even when they are 
performing badly for the year. This is to prevent the negative effects on firm performance in the future. A 
study by Norman and Kamran (2005), on 153 firms on the KLSE, found that the firms are engaged in 
discretionary earnings management during financial difficulties. These sample firms undertake debt 
contract renegotiations caused by debt covenant violation.  
Another motive under altruistic motivation is to reduce taxation burdens. Prior research found 
significant evidence that taxation can drive managers to manage earnings. A study by Adhikari, Derashid 
and Zhung (2005) suggested that for Malaysian firms, the incentives to manage earnings are probably 
related to tax policy changes. Conversely, a study by Coppens and Peek (2005) found that taxation is not 
an incentive to engage in earnings management in some countries where tax regulations strongly 
influence financial reporting. Marques, Rodrigues and Craig (2011) found that firms with higher rates of 
income tax were found to reduce earnings to near zero. 
Another research, in Tunisia, found that managers in Tunisia are involved in earnings management to 
avoid losses and earnings decrease. This is because managers participate in management and affect most 
of the management decisions (Amar and Abaoub, 2010). A study by Coppens and Peek (2005) stated that 
without capital market pressure, firms in eight European countries still engage in earnings management in 
order to avoid reporting small losses.   
2.2.2 Speculative motivation  
Contrary to altruistic motivation, speculative motivation happens when managers want to obtain their 
own personal benefits or to meet internal targets (Chen and Tsai, 2010; Stice and Stice, 2010). Managers 
commonly use the production/contribution manipulation to achieve this motive. Internal earnings targets 
are the financial goals established within a company. This target will drive managers to increase sales 
efforts, control costs and use resources more efficiently. Consequently, this situation will lead managers 
to engage in earnings management in order to meet that targeted goal.  
Study by Aljifri (2007), Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) and Healy (1985) mentioned that 
compensation/bonus plans might provide a strong motive for managers to engage in earnings 
management. A study by Healy and Wahlen (1999) suggested that compensation could influence certain 
managers in firms to manage earnings to increase their bonus rewards. Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995) 
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found that managers smoothen performance towards the firm s financial goals for the target payout from 
their bonus plan. Guidry, Leone and Rock (1996) reported that business-unit-managers have a motive to 
manipulate earnings for the purpose of maximizing their short-term bonus plan. A study by Bergstresser 
and Philippon (2006) found that CEOs in companies that depend on the share price to get higher 
compensation will engage in earnings management in order to obtain their desired compensation. Glaum, 
Lichtblau and Lindemann (2004) further supported the assertion. In addition, a study by Latridis and 
Kadarinis (2009) showed that managers also have a tendency to employ earnings for the purpose of 
improving company performance, and, consequently, raise their compensation.  
2.2.3 Pressure from affiliated parties   
While speculative motivation relates to internal targets, Stice and Stice (2010) also suggested another 
category of motives to engage in earnings management, which include meeting external expectation 
through pressure from affiliated parties. Normally the shareholders and board of directors as well as 
analysts try to do something in order to achieve the company s goals. This situation will lead to the 
earnings management practices. In addition, study by Matsumoto (2002) showed that the firms will 
choose to manage earnings when their financial information is depending on the implicit claims with their 
stakeholders. Other than that, the author also found that firms in industries that earnings are more value-
relevant will take actions in order to meet or exceed analysts forecast in financial announcement.  Li, 
Selover and Stein (2011) found that increases in earnings management are associated with firms owned 
by government, firms reporting to higher levels of government and firms in more market-oriented 
regions.  
However, a study by Peasnell, Pope and Young (2005) argued that the participation of board members 
and shareholders does not lead to earnings management. This was proven in their study, which indicated 
that the likelihood of managers engaging in earnings management for the purpose of avoiding reporting 
losses and earnings reduction is negatively related to the number of outsiders on the board. The authors 
also found that the chance of widespread use of earnings management among firms with a high 
proportion of outside board members is significantly low. However, a study by Prensipe and Bar-Yosef 
(2011) concluded that the presence of family members on the board of directors in Italian firms 
encourages managers to participate in earnings management activities.  
In addition, Stice and Stice (2010) mentioned that another factor that drives managers to engage in 
earnings management is to meet external expectations, which come from a wide variety of external 
stakeholders. Each of them has their specific interests in the financial performance of the company. 
Examples of external stakeholders include employees, customers and suppliers who look at the financial 
figures in different ways compared to internal stakeholders and they have their own differing interests in 
the same figures. A study by Jiraporn (2007) found that the existence of employee stock ownership plans 
in firms could reduce managerial opportunism in the form of earnings management.    
3. Research method  
This study adapts the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) in interpreting the 
intention to be involved in earnings management behaviour. Under this theory, there are two construct 
which are attitude towards behaviour and subjective norms. According to Uddin and Gillet (2002), 
attitude towards behaviour construct incorporates the individual s belief about the likelihood that the 
behaviour will result in a particular outcome and the person s evaluation of that outcome. (p.16). On the 
other hand, a subjective norm is the conviction of particular referents and individual incentive to obey 
with the referents. Altruistic and speculative motivation can be classified into attitude towards behaviour 
construct while pressure from affiliated parties fall under subjective norms construct. Although there have 
been broad studies about the motivation of earnings management, this study is the first study in Malaysia 
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to use primary data to identify the motives for earnings management. In distributing the questionnaire to 
the respondent, an official letter issued by the researcher was attached. The collected data was analysed 
using the Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) version 16.0 for the purpose of testing validity 
of the instrument of the study.    
3.1     Survey instrument  
To collect data regarding the motivation for earnings management, a questionnaire comprising two 
sections was distributed. The first section contains 27 potential questionable earnings management 
motives and the second section comprises questions concerning the demographic information, such as 
gender, race, age, highest education and professional qualification, which are included to obtain basic 
information about their business. This questionnaire was based on the earnings management intention 
questionnaire designed by Uddin and Gillet (2002).   
3.2 Data collection  
The questionnaires were issued to auditors of the sampled audit firms through the mail in March 2012. 
The respondent firms were selected from a list of audit firms on the MIA website. All the audit firms that 
are incorporated in Malaysia are required to register with the MIA. A total of 197 questionnaires were 
mailed to the respondents. The respondents were given 1 month to complete the questionnaire and return 
to the researcher.   
4.0 Results and discussions  
Out of 197 questionnaires, only 91 were returned. After checking all the returned questionnaires, 3 
questionnaires were incomplete, thus making the total number of useable questionnaires 88.  
Table 1.Descriptive Statistic 
Descriptive items Frequency Per cent Valid Per cent Cumulative Per cent 
 Gender 
Male 
Female  
32 
56  
36.4 
63.6  
36.4 
63.6  
36.4 
100 
  Age 
30 or 
under 
31-40 
41-50 
51 or 
older  
44 
37 
3 
4  
49.9 
42 
3.5 
4.6  
49.9 
42 
3.5 
4.6  
49.9 
91.9 
95.4 
100 
 Race 
Malay 
Chinese 
Indian 
Others  
53 
29 
5 
1  
60.2 
33 
5.7 
1.1  
60.2 
33 
5.7 
1.1  
60.2 
93.2 
98.9 
100 
 Highest education 
First 
degree 
Master 
degree 
PHD 
Others  
63 
6 
1 
18  
71.6 
6.8 
1.1 
20.5  
71.6 
6.8 
1.1 
20.5  
71.6 
78.4 
7935 
100 
 Professional 
qualification         
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Yes 
No 
42 
46 
47.7 
52.3 
47.7 
52.3 
47.7 
100 
Current position 
5 or 
under 
6-10 
11-15  
68 
18 
2  
77.4 
20.3 
2.3  
77.4 
20.3 
2.3  
77.4 
97.7 
100 
Involved in decision 
making 
Yes 
No  
37 
51  
42 
58  
42 
58  
42 
100 
Based on Table 1, the study found that only 32 (36.4 %) were male and the rest were female, which is 
56 (63.6 %). The age of respondents ranged from 30 to 51 years and the average was 31 years old. For the 
races, 53 (60.2 %) out of 88 respondents were Malays and the rest consisted of Chinese (33%), Indian 
(5.7%) and others (1.1%). The majority of the respondents only have a first degree for their highest 
education, which is 63 (71.6%), for the master s degree only 6 respondents (6.8%) and for PHD level 
only 1 respondent. Other respondents did not have a degree but had acquired a professional qualification. 
A total of 42 respondents had acquired a professional qualification, such as Malaysian Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) and Certified Public Accountant (CPA). Meanwhile, the length 
of time the respondents had served in their current position ranged from 5 to 15 years, with an average of 
3 years. In addition, only 37 respondents have been involved in making decisions that touch upon 
earnings management during their tenure.    
4.1 Results for motivation of earnings management  
The purpose of this paper is to detect the behaviour for earnings management. It can be shown by 
using the mean of the data as a tool to measure the primary motives that lead auditors to become involved 
in earnings management.   
Table 2.Results of statistic 
Items Altruistic motivation Speculative motivation Pressure from affiliated parties. 
Mean  2.6847 2.5023 2.7102 
Std. deviation 0.49566 0.80629 0.59330 
From the table above, the higher mean is from pressure from affiliated parties which is 2.7102 with 
standard deviation 0.59330. This shows that earnings management was practiced by auditors in Malaysia 
due to the pressure from other parties. The examples are from directors, managers, shareholders, 
creditors and co-workers. These parties have their own interest in the company, and, therefore, they will 
act as for their own benefit. The second motivation that leads auditors to become involved in earnings 
management is from altruistic motivation which the mean is 2.6847 and standard deviation is 0.49566. 
This depicts that auditors choose to protect the company performance rather than following ethical 
practice. Meanwhile, the speculative motivation was the last motive that auditors choose to engage in 
earnings management, which shows the means is 2.5023 and standard deviation is 0.80629. Auditors in 
Malaysia are more concerned with the interests of others than themselves. For them, the satisfaction of 
others parties and the performance of the company are the primary goals.  
5.0 Conclusions  
Although earnings management is widely agreed to be an unhealthy activity, not much research has 
been dedicated to investigating the motivation behind earnings management. In Malaysia, the results 
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show that the primary goal of auditors is not for their own benefit but for the sake of company 
performance and to give full satisfaction to affiliated parties. Therefore, the auditors are committed to the 
interest of others. In terms of guideline for future research, perhaps future study could focus on senior 
auditors who have more exposure on earnings management to enhance the robustness of the results. 
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